A Modern Approach to IP Protection and Trojan Prevention: Split
  Manufacturing for 3D ICs and Obfuscation of Vertical Interconnects by Patnaik, Satwik et al.
c© 2019 IEEE. This is the author’s version of the work. It is posted here for personal use. Not for redistribution. The
definitive Version of Record is published in IEEE TETC, DOI 10.1109/TETC.2019.2933572
A Modern Approach to IP Protection and Trojan
Prevention: Split Manufacturing for 3D ICs and
Obfuscation of Vertical Interconnects
Satwik Patnaik, Student Member, IEEE, Mohammed Ashraf, Ozgur Sinanoglu, Senior Member, IEEE,
and Johann Knechtel, Member, IEEE
Abstract—Split manufacturing (SM) and layout camouflaging (LC) are two promising techniques to obscure integrated circuits (ICs)
from malicious entities during and after manufacturing. While both techniques enable protecting the intellectual property (IP) of ICs, SM
can further mitigate the insertion of hardware Trojans (HTs). In this paper, we strive for the “best of both worlds,” that is we seek to
combine the individual strengths of SM and LC. By jointly extending SM and LC techniques toward 3D integration, an up-and-coming
paradigm based on stacking and interconnecting of multiple chips, we establish a modern approach to hardware security. Toward that
end, we develop a security-driven CAD and manufacturing flow for 3D ICs in two variations, one for IP protection and one for HT
prevention. Essential concepts of that flow are (i) “3D splitting” of the netlist to protect, (ii) obfuscation of the vertical interconnects (i.e.,
the wiring between stacked chips), and (iii) for HT prevention, a security-driven synthesis stage. We conduct comprehensive
experiments on DRC-clean layouts of multi-million-gate DARPA and OpenCores designs (and others). Strengthened by extensive
security analysis for both IP protection and HT prevention, we argue that entering the third dimension is eminent for effective and
efficient hardware security.
Index Terms—Hardware Security, Split Manufacturing, Layout Camouflaging, IP Protection, Hardware Trojans, 3D ICs, Interconnects.
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1 INTRODUCTION
ON the one hand, design practices by the industry attachimportance to optimize for power, performance, and
area (PPA) at the level of physical design or design architec-
ture (e.g., cache hierarchies, speculative execution). On the
other hand, there are powerful attacks such as Meltdown [2],
which skillfully exploit these very practices to extract sensi-
tive data at runtime. Besides, malicious foundries may im-
plement so-called hardware Trojans (HTs) which can help an
adversary to extract sensitive data purposefully [3]. Apart
from such concerns regarding the security and trustworthi-
ness of hardware at runtime, protecting the hardware itself
from threats such as piracy of design intellectual property
(IP) or illegal overproduction is another challenge. That
is because to avoid the burgeoning cost associated with
ever-shrinking technology nodes, most chip companies out-
source the fabrication of their ICs nowadays to third-party
foundries which are potentially untrustworthy. Moreover,
the tools and know-how required for reverse engineering
(RE) of even high-end ICs are becoming more accessible
and less costly [4]; therefore, a malicious end-user obtaining
the IP after production is another significant threat. Various
schemes for IP protection have been put forth over the
last decade, and most of them can be classified into logic
locking (LL), layout camouflaging (LC), or split manufac-
turing (SM). These three classes consider different threats:
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SM seeks to protect against untrusted foundries, LC against
untrusted end-users, and LL against both. Accordingly,
there are different assumptions on the attackers’ capabilities,
different limitations, and different concepts for realization.
We provide more details in Sec. 2, and the interested reader
may also see [5].
Independent of hardware security, 3D integration has
made significant strides over recent years. The concept
of 3D integration is to stack and interconnect multiple
chips/dies/tiers/layers, thereby promising “More Moore,”
i.e., to overcome the scalability bottleneck which is ex-
acerbated by ever-increasing challenges for pitch scaling,
routing congestion, process variations, et cetera [6]. Recent
studies and prototypes have shown that 3D integration
can indeed offer significant benefits over conventional 2D
chips [7], [8], which can ultimately also help to thoroughly
utilize the existing technology nodes. Besides, 3D integra-
tion advances manufacturing capabilities by various means
such as parallel handling of wafers, higher yields for the
smaller outlines of individual chips, and heterogeneous
integration (“More than Moore”).
In this paper, we propose a modern approach to hard-
ware security. We show that 3D integration is an excellent
candidate to combine the strengths of LC and SM in one
scheme (Fig. 1). The key idea is to “3D split” the design
into multiple tiers and to obfuscate (i.e., randomize and
camouflage) the vertical interconnects between those tiers.
Our approach is a significant advancement over prior art in
IP protection—while LC may thwart end-user adversaries
and SM may safeguard against fab-based adversaries, only
our work can readily protect against both threats. We note
that LL targets for the same, but the viability of LL schemes
depends on tamper-proof memories, which is an area of
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Fig. 1. Our scheme is based on 3D integration, particularly on face-to-
face (F2F) 3D ICs. Through-silicon vias (TSVs) are used for external
connections, and redistribution layers (RDLs) for vertical interconnects.
Our security-centric splitting of the design across two tiers, along with
obfuscation of the RDLs, allows for IP protection and prevention of HT
insertion. That is because the two tiers, even when considered together
by colluding foundries, reveal neither the entire design nor individual
components prone to HT insertion.
ongoing research [9]. Concerning HT prevention, the second
major part of our work besides IP protection, we show that
3D integration advances the state-of-the-art in two ways.
For one, components considered prone to HT insertion can
be delegated to trusted facilities for fabrication of separate
chips, hindering HT insertion to begin with. For another,
when the decision on which components are prone to HT
insertion is difficult, our notion of obfuscating vertical in-
terconnects is essential to implement other, foundationally
secure schemes with superior cost and scalability.
The contributions of this work are as follows:
1) We put forward a practical threat model which is
in line with the present-day business practices of
design houses (Sec. 3). This model necessitates the
application of both LC and SM in conjunction.
2) We leverage 3D integration for a modern approach
to IP protection and HT prevention (Sec. 4). We
combine the strengths of LC, SM, and prior art
on HT prevention, all within one concept. The key
idea is to “3D split” the design into two tiers (or
more, in principle) and to obfuscate the vertical
interconnects between those tiers. We explore two
scenarios for commissioning different trusted and
untrusted foundries, offering different or same tech-
nology node(s). In that section and throughout the
paper, we use DARPA and OpenCores multi-million-
gate designs (besides the well-known ITC-99 and
ISCAS-85 benchmarks), to provide meaningful ex-
perimental studies.
3) We develop a security-driven CAD and manufac-
turing flow for face-to-face (F2F) 3D ICs, initially
tailored for IP protection (Sec. 5). In addition to
various steps required for an end-to-end 3D IC CAD
flow, key concepts for the flow are security-driven
partitioning techniques as well as obfuscation of the
vertical interconnects in the F2F 3D IC. We imple-
ment our flow using Cadence Innovus and demon-
strate its applicability on a broad set of benchmarks.
4) We conduct a thorough analysis of DRC-clean lay-
outs, and we contrast with the prior art of LC or
SM wherever applicable (Sec. 6). We further present
an extensive security analysis, underpinned by an-
alytical and empirical data as well as by a novel
proximity-centric attack on 3D ICs (Sec. 6).
Interposer Stack
Substrate, PCB with Metal Layers
Interposer with TSVs and Metal Layers
Die 1 Die 2
TSV-based 3D IC
Substrate, PCB with Metal Layers
Die 3 with TSVs
Die 2 with TSVs
Die 1
Monolithic 3D IC
Substrate, PCB with Metal Layers
Die 1
}Die 2
}Die 3
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Vias
F2F 3D IC
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Die 2 with TSVs for IO, PG
Die 1
Fig. 2. The four main flavors of 3D integration. Metal layers are colored in
green, active layers in brown (along with modules in blue), and bonding
underfills in yellow. F2F 3D ICs allow for direct metal-to-metal bonding.
5) We extend our flow toward HT prevention (Sec. 7),
specifically for a strong threat model where the fab-
based attacker already holds the full netlist to begin
with [10]. Initially we identify the limitations of
prior art [10], [11]: the attainable level of security,
scalability, and layout cost incurred to guarantee
this level of protection. To tackle these limitations,
we propose and implement a security-driven syn-
thesis strategy along with our established 3D IC
CAD flow. Here we also enable, for the first time, the
concerned designer to purposefully protect struc-
tures of choice at design time.
6) We comprehensively study various scenarios to
demonstrate the resilience and efficacy of our ap-
proach to HT prevention (Sec. 8). For example, for
the ITC-99 benchmark b19, the attacker has only a
chance of 0.25% for successful targeted HT insertion.
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 3D Integration and CAD Flows
3D integration has experienced significant traction over
the recent years, for both improving scalability as well
manufacturing and integration capabilities [6], [12], [13].
3D integration can be broadly classified into four flavors
(Fig. 2): (1) through-silicon via (TSV)-based 3D ICs, where
chips are fabricated separately and then stacked, with the
vertical inter-chip connections being realized by relatively
large metal TSVs running through the entire silicon chips;
(2) F2F stacking, where two chips or tiers are fabricated
separately and then bonded together directly at their metal
faces (along with TSVs only required for external con-
nections); (3) monolithic 3D ICs, where multiple tiers are
manufactured sequentially, with the vertical interconnects
based on regular metal vias; (4) 2.5D integration, where
chips are fabricated separately and then bonded to a system-
level interconnect carrier, the interposer. Each flavor has its
scope, benefits and drawbacks, and requirements for CAD
and manufacturing processes [6].
F2F stacking has arguably emerged as the most promis-
ing (along with monolithic 3D ICs); various studies are
actively streamlining efforts for commercial adoption, e.g.,
[7], [12], [14]. Note that prior art is inherently oblivious to
hardware security. These studies carefully trade off intra-
tier wiring with vertical interconnects across tiers. While
vertical interconnects are the key feature of 3D integration,
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an overly large number of crossings/cuts can have a signifi-
cant, counter-productive impact on PPA [12]. As we explain
in Sec. 6.4, however, a large number of cuts is mandatory
for a strong resilience against IP piracy. Hence, our flow
comprises techniques to explore this security-cost trade-off.
2.2 Split Manufacturing
SM offers an interesting solution to safeguard the design
IP, but only during manufacturing time. That is, SM can-
not protect against malicious end-users. Traditionally, SM
means that the device layer and few lower metal layers
(front-end-of-line, FEOL) are fabricated using a high-end,
potentially untrusted foundry, whereas the remaining inter-
connects (back-end-of-line, BEOL) are grown on top of the
FEOL wafer by a trusted facility. Considering the different
pitches of the FEOL/BEOL metal layers, SM supports a
cost-aware supply chain. That is, as long as the FEOL and
BEOL are separated at some higher metal layer, any low-end
facility may be commissioned for the BEOL with relatively
little commercial cost.1 Now, the security promise of SM lies
in the fact that an untrusted foundry only holds a part of
the overall design, making it difficult to infer the complete
design functionality, and thereby hindering an adversary
from IP piracy or targeted insertion of HTs.
Existing CAD tools, however, due to their focus on
design closure (and their so-far agnostic view on security),
tend to leave hints for an FEOL-based adversary. For exam-
ple, to honor PPA, any to-be-connected cells are typically
placed close to each other. Based on this insight, Rajen-
dran et al. [15] proposed a so-called proximity attack which
models this principle to infer the missing BEOL connections.
Various placement-centric [16], [17] and/or routing-
centric [17], [18] schemes have been proposed recently,
which all aim to counter the efforts of proximity attacks [15],
[16]. Among those defense schemes, lifting of wires above
the split layer remains an intuitive way to obfuscate the
IP. That is, the critical wires (as selected by the designer)
are lifted, e.g., with the help of constraining the router via
routing pins in higher layers or inserting artificial routing
blockages. We conducted exploratory experiments on the
randomized lifting of nets (Fig. 3); here we observe steady
and significant increases in PPA cost. More comparative
results, also on 2.5D/3D solutions, are given in Sec. 6.
We acknowledge that the basic idea for 3D SM was
already envisioned in 2008 by Tezzaron [19]. Also, various
studies are hinting at 3D integration for SM, but most have
limitations or cover different scenarios. For example, Dofe et
al. [20] remain on the conceptional level, or Xie et al. [21] and
Imeson et al. [10] consider 2.5D integration where only wires
are hidden from the untrusted foundry. We summarize the
prior art on 3D SM in Table 1, along with that for 3D LC.
2.3 Layout Camouflaging
LC foils an adversary’s efforts for RE of a chip. LC is accom-
plished during manufacturing by (i) dissolving optically
1. This consideration is also essential for adopting SM as a security
scheme in practice. It seems more realistic to find some well-established
and trustworthy facility which can, however, only offer large-pitch
processing capabilities than to find some high-end facility which can
also be trusted, among the few to begin with. See also Sec. 4.1.
TABLE 1
Comparison of 3D schemes for hardware security. The integration style
is either 2.5D, stacked 3D (3D), or monolithic 3D (M3D).
Reference Style Scheme Scope Assets Trusted Entity
[10] 2.5D SM HT Wires BEOL
[21] 2.5D SM IP Piracy Wires BEOL
[22] 3D SM & LC IP Piracy Gates & Wires FEOL & BEOL
[23] M3D LC IP Piracy Gates FEOL
Ours 3D SM & LC IP Piracy & HT Gates & Wires BEOL
10% 20% 30% 40% 50%
Layout Camouflaging
0
50
100
150
200 Area
Power
Performance
10% 20% 30% 40% 50%
Explicit Lifting
0
20
40
60
80
Area
Power
Performance
Fig. 3. PPA cost (%) for look-alike LC [24] (left) and explicit lifting of
randomly selected wires to M8 (right) in SM. Results are averaged
across ITC-99 benchmarks. For the LC scheme (left), the impact on
power and area is substantial, given that the NAND-NOR-XOR structure
in [24] incurs 4× and 5.5× more area and power compared to a regular
2-input NAND gate. For the SM scheme (right), the cost for area is
severe. That is because routing resources are relatively scarce for M8
(pitch = 0.84µm) and lifting of wires occupies further resources, which
can only be obtained by enlarging the die outlines.
distinguishable traits of standard cells, e.g., using look-alike
gates [24] or secretly configured MUXes [25], (ii) selective
doping implantation for threshold-voltage-based obfusca-
tion [26], [27], or (iii) rendering the BEOL wires and/or
vias resilient against RE [28]. It is important to note that
most schemes require alterations to the FEOL process, which
can be complex and costly. In any case, since physical
obfuscation constitutes the secret for IP protection by LC,
the involved manufacturing facilities have to be trusted—LC
cannot protect against malicious fabs.
Powerful Boolean satisfiability (SAT)-based attacks [29]
have questioned the efficacy of various LC schemes, leading
to a “cat-and-mouse game” between adversaries and de-
fenders. The base for these attacks are analytical models for
all possible assignments of the camouflaged design parts
and efficient pruning of the search space of assignments.
Recent security schemes thus attempt to impose excessively
complex problem instances for SAT solvers by (i) inserting
dedicated challenging structures like camouflaged AND
trees [30], (ii) minimally modifying critical parts of the
design functionality [31], or (iii) full-chip camouflaging [28].
Existing schemes tend to incur significant PPA overheads
once LC is applied for large parts of the design. For example
in [24], camouflaging 50% of the design results in ≈150%
overheads for power and area, respectively (Fig. 3). Emerg-
ing schemes such as threshold-voltage-dependent LC still
suffer from PPA overheads; see Sec. 6 for more comparative
results. As for 3D integration, Yan et al. [23] proposed LC
for monolithic 3D ICs, and Gu et al. [22] apply LC for
3D ICs, albeit using regular 2D LC schemes. Hence, while
promising, both works still require trusted FEOL facilities.
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2.4 Hardware Trojans
Apart from IP protection, the possibility for HT insertion by
an untrustworthy foundry also raises concerns, especially
for military applications. ICs that are “bugged” with HTs
may (i) deviate from their specified functionality, (ii) leak
sensitive information, and/or (iii) become unreliable or fail
at particular points in time [3]. Trojans can be broadly clas-
sified into digital Trojans and physical Trojans, depending
on their payload and trigger mechanisms. Digital HTs are
activated by either a specific, rare input pattern or via “time
bombs” on certain operations (or input patterns) being
executed for a particular number of cycles. Physical Trojans
are activated either by (i) aging effects such as electro-
migration, or (ii) internal or external side-channel triggers.
In this paper, we limit the scope to digital Trojans.
In general, there are two classes of HT countermeasures:
reactive, i.e., monitoring for HTs at runtime, and pro-active,
i.e., seeking to prevent HT insertion during the design
and/or manufacturing time. For reactive countermeasures,
there are various approaches, e.g., based on current moni-
toring [32] or security wrappers [33]. For pro-active counter-
measures, prior art covers, e.g., built-in self-authentication
modules [34] and SM-centric obfuscation schemes [10], [11]
among others. Note that the fab-based adversary needs
to comprehend the layout under attack for targeted HT
insertion; that is why schemes like LL and SM can prevent
HT insertion to a certain extent.
In this work, we focus on pro-active prevention of HTs.
In particular, we consider a strong threat model where the
attacker already holds the complete gate-level netlist [10].
We review the prior art [10], [11] in more detail in Sec. 7.1.
3 A PRACTICAL THREAT MODEL
Here we put forward a novel, practical threat model which
is in line with the business practices of present-day elec-
tronics companies. Consider the following scenario. Lacking
its own fabrication facilities, a company commissions a
potentially malicious foundry to manufacture their newest
version of some chip. This new version is typically extended
from some previous version (Fig. 4(a))—the reuse of IP
modules and the re-purposing of proven architectures are
well-known practices. For example, think of the flagship
iPhone R© by Apple R©. The iPhone 7, based on the A10 chip,
was launched in September 2016, and the iPhone X, based
on the successor chip A11, was launched in September 2017.
In such a scenario, it is intuitive that pirating the new
IP can become significantly less challenging for fab-based
adversaries. In case the same fab was already commissioned
for the previous chip version, they readily hold the layout
of that earlier version; otherwise, the adversaries can apply
RE on chips of the previous version bought in the market. In
any case, the adversaries can compare that new layout with
the prior layout, to locate and focus on those parts which are
different and unique. Recall that understanding the layout
and its functionality in full is necessary for targeted HT
insertion; this becomes notably less challenging as well.
Now, the conclusion for this threat model is that both
LC and SM are required for manufacturing of all different chip
versions. LC is required to prevent RE of the current layout
by any other fab commissioned for later chip versions,
C D
A B
E F
Trusted Foundry Untrusted Foundry
A’ B’ C’
D’ E’ F’
A’’ B’’ C’’
D’’ E’’ F’’
A B
C D
A
B
D E
C
F
(b)(a)
Fig. 4. (a) Current chip version (top) versus new chip version (bottom).
For the new version, the IP modules E and F are entirely new, while the
other modules are revised and/or reshaped. (b) Foundry scenarios for
our IP protection scheme on 3D ICs. For both tiers manufactured by an
untrusted foundry (right), IP modules can be split up for obfuscation.
whereas SM is necessary to prevent the fab which is man-
ufacturing the current version (and which is also tasked to
implement LC) from readily inferring the complete layout
of the current version. Prior art can only account for this
scenario by applying SM on top of LC, which can exacerbate
the individual overheads and shortcomings, as discussed in
Sec. 2 and 6. Next, we outline our scheme to combine SM
and LC naturally while leveraging 3D integration.
4 3D INTEGRATION AS MODERN APPROACH TO IP
PROTECTION AND TROJAN PREVENTION
The primary advancement we advocate for SM is to “3D
split” the design into multiple tiers. That is, unlike regular
SM in 2D where the layout is split into FEOL and BEOL, we
split the design itself into two parts (or more, in principle).
These parts are manufactured as separate chips, and then
stacked and vertically interconnected following the F2F
integration process (the latter without loss of generality).
We suggest that 3D SM can be achieved either by commis-
sioning different foundries or one foundry (Fig. 4(b)):
1) Different trusted and untrusted foundries (Sec. 4.1):
Consider one trusted and one untrusted foundry,
both with full FEOL and BEOL capabilities, but
for different technology nodes. It is intuitive to
delegate the sensitive parts to the trusted fab exclu-
sively. While this approach is straightforward and
inherently secure against fab-based adversaries, its
practicality is limited, as we discuss below.
2) Untrusted foundries/foundry (Sec. 4.2): Consider one
or more high-end but untrusted fab(s). This way, we
can benefit from the latest technology but, naturally,
have to obfuscate the design in such a way that the
fab(s) cannot readily infer the whole layout, even
when they are colluding. Once such strong protec-
tion is in place, it is economically more reasonable
to commission only one fab.
It is important to note the following. First, we elaborate
on both scenarios in this section, but we focus on the more
relevant and practical Scenario 2) in the remainder of this
work. Second, to further achieve security against (a) fab-
based adversaries and (b) malicious end-users, we later on
(a) randomize the vertical interconnects and (b) obfuscate
those interconnects. Therefore, we then require a trusted
BEOL facility, but no trusted FEOL facility.
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Trusted
Fabrication
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?
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(a) (b)
Fig. 5. Two approaches to 3D integration to prevent targeted HT inser-
tion. (a) Assuming a trusted foundry (along with another untrusted one),
the vulnerable design parts (marked by “X”) can be delegated to the
trusted foundry. (b) Assuming only an untrusted FEOL facility, the design
has to be split in such a manner that an FEOL-based attacker cannot
readily identify the vulnerable parts. This also requires randomization of
the vertical interconnects using a trusted BEOL facility.
4.1 Different Trusted and Untrusted Foundries
Commissioning several foundries providing different trust
levels and supporting different technology nodes holds two
key implications as follows.
First, it is intuitive to assign sensitive design parts to the
chip manufactured by the trusted foundry, for example (i)
some new IP to protect (Fig. 4(b)), or (ii) parts considered
vulnerable to targeted HT insertion (Fig. 5(a))—such an ap-
proach is secure by construction against fab-based adversaries
for the following reasons. For IP piracy, there is no generic
attack model in the literature yet which can infer missing
connections and gates when given only a part of the overall
design. We believe that such “black-box attacks” would be
very challenging, if possible at all. For HT insertion, the
adversary cannot perform targeted insertion once the vul-
nerable parts are delegated to the trusted chip exclusively.
Second, in case a trusted fab and another untrusted fab
are commissioned in parallel, it is implied that these two
fabs would support different nodes, with the trusted fab
typically offering only access to an older technology. In fact,
if the trusted foundry would be able to offer the same high-
end node, one could simply commission the trusted foundry
for manufacturing of the whole design. Due to the different
pitches for different technology nodes, however, only a frac-
tion of the design can be delegated to the trusted low-end
fabrication. Also, power and performance will be dominated
by the low-end chip, where factors such as parasitics, level
shifting, and clock synchronization may further exacerbate
the overheads [14], [35].
4.1.1 Case Study on DARPA Common Evaluation Platform
Next, we study the scope for such heterogeneous 3D SM.2
That is, we consider a case study where the sensitive logic is
moved to a trusted fab, offering the older 90nm technology,
whereas the remaining logic is delegated to an untrusted
45nm fab. The case study is based on multi-million-gate
System-on-Chip (SoC), provided by DARPA as a Common
Evaluation Platform (CEP) [36]. An overview of the SoC
architecture is given in Fig. 6(a); it is a one-master ten-
slaves system. The master is a re-engineered version of the
OpenRISC processor, called OR1200. This OR1200 master
executes code from a 128KB static RAM (SRAM), which we
had to omit for our layout-level study, due to unavailability
2. Another independent study is provided in Sec. S.I.
Crypto ModulesProcessor
DSP Modules Sensitive
IP
(a)
GPS,
90nm,
Trusted
Fab
Others,
45nm,
Untrust-
ed Fab
(b)
Fig. 6. (a) Architecture of the DARPA Common Evaluation Platform [36].
The GPS block is considered the sensitive IP; it is thus to be delegated
to the trusted fabrication. (b) Heterogeneous 3D implementation, with
colors corresponding to modules in (a).
of memory macros in the considered 45nm library.3 The
slaves comprise cryptographic (crypto) modules, digital sig-
nal processing (DSP) modules, and a global positioning sys-
tem (GPS) processing module. The Wishbone/DBUS con-
nect the processor master with all other blocks, while UART
provides a serial interface for off-chip communication.
Given that all considered crypto modules are public
knowledge, the designer (attacker) would not be interested
in protecting (retrieving) the related IP. However, the DSP
modules and other parts may contain customized logic
and sensitive IP worth to protect. As discussed before, the
choice of which modules/logic to protect lies solely with
the design house, as they can best judge which components
require IP protection. For our case study, we assume the GPS
processing module to be that sensitive asset.
Experimental Setup: We use the NanGate 45nm li-
brary [37] and Synopsys 90nm library [38]. Innovus 17.1
is used for layout generation and PPA evaluation; the
setup details are further elaborated in Sec. 6.2.3. First, we
synthesize the 2D baseline designs, considering the slow
corners for the 45nm and 90nm nodes, respectively; the
results are given in Table 2. Second, we partition the 45nm
baseline design such that all logic of the GPS module can
be delegated to a trusted 90nm chip. Here we follow the
design flow shown in Fig. 7 in general, but there are some
differences as follows: (a) we have to re-synthesize the GPS
module for 90nm, with the same timing constraint as for the
remaining modules, which is also to simplify the clock-tree
synthesis (CTS) for the individual tiers [35]; (b) for layout
evaluation, we revise the LIB and LEF files for the GPS tier;
(c) we do not undertake any additional security-centric steps
(highlighted in bold in Fig. 7) as the GPS IP is fully secured
against adversaries residing in the 45nm fab. Finally, note
that we assume supply voltages of 0.95V for 45nm and 0.9V
for 90nm when generating the power numbers.4
Results: The PPA results for this different-foundries 3D
implementation are given in Table 3. We observe overheads
of 63.09%, 30.45%, and 15.03% for area, power, and delay,
3. The memory is considered to be available off-chip. In any case,
memory macros are not considered sensitive parts, and can thus be
ignored for this security-focused study.
4. In case different parts require considerably more different voltages,
level shifters should be used. Along with technology scaling, however,
the nominal voltage has stagnated (since 90nm), which allows most
modern processes to run at compatible voltages without shifters [22].
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TABLE 2
Results for separate 2D baselines, using the NanGate 45nm library [37]
and the Synopsys 90nm library [38]. Layouts are DRC clean, and have
a utilization of 70%. Area is in µm2, power in mW , and delay in ns.
Benchmark 45nm 90nm
Inst. Area Power Delay Inst. Area Power Delay
CEP 842,685 1,568,893 429.91 4.41 801,814 10,582,015 1,488 5.84
TABLE 3
Results for the heterogeneous 3D implementation of Fig. 6(b), with the
GPS module being assigned exclusively to the 90nm tier. Layouts are
DRC clean, and have a utilization of 70%. Area is in µm2, power in
mW , and delay in ns.
Benchmark Area Power Delay
45nm Inst. 45nm Area 90nm Inst. 90nm Area
CEP 708,858 1,409,486.12 131,342 1,149,300.63 560.81 5.08
respectively, when compared to the 2D 45nm baseline.
However, when comparing the 3D implementation with
the trusted 90nm baseline, our approach offers savings of
75.82%, 62.31%, and 13.1% for area, power, and delay, re-
spectively. Also note that the 90nm GPS tier comprises only
15.63% of the total number of instances, although it incurs
almost the same area footprint. In short, heterogeneous
3D integration may indeed provide benefits over a purely
trusted fabrication (90nm), but it naturally cannot compete
with advanced fabrication (45nm).
4.1.2 Summary
This approach of utilizing a trusted and another untrusted
foundry for 3D integration may be inherently secure against
fab-based adversaries, and may also offer some PPA benefits
over a 2D implementation using only the trusted and old
node, but it also limited in practice. That is because one can
delegate only a small fraction of the overall design to the
trusted foundry (i.e., at least without incurring area cost),
which limits the scale for IP protection, and the performance
and power of this 3D approach cannot compete with the
advanced but untrusted 2D node.
4.2 Untrusted Foundries
Engaging with (i) several untrusted foundries offering the
same technology node or (ii) one untrusted foundry also
holds some key implications as follows.
First, power and performance of such “conventional”
3D integration can be expected to excel those of the het-
erogeneous scenario above. We note that splitting of 2D IP
modules within 3D ICs has been successfully demonstrated,
e.g., in [39], albeit without hardware security in mind.
Hence, savings from the folding of IP modules may provide
some margin for security schemes. However, we also show
in detail in this work that this margin naturally depends on
the design and the measures applied for the scheme.
Second, although IP modules can be split across tiers,
which may mislead an RE attacker (a malicious end-user),
both tiers are still manufactured by some untrusted fab(s).
This fact implies that LC schemes targeting on the de-
vice level cannot help to protect from adversaries in those
foundries. Interestingly, there is another LC flavor emerging,
that is the obfuscation of interconnects [28], [40]. We argue
that obfuscation of interconnects is a natural match for
1. Design Partitioning Stage
Baseline 2D design
Extract timing information
Partition netlist into 
two groups (top/bottom)
3. Design Closure
Encapsulate top and bottom 
partitions in wrapper
Place and route top partition
Assemble and implement design
Annotate parasitics for F2F vias
in wrapper
Analyze PPA, final checks
Final F2F design: top/bottom tier 
and RDL
Random
Maximizing cuts
Timing-aware
Randomizing vias
2. F2F Via Planning Stage
Implement bottom group and 
determine location of F2F vias
Place F2F vias, customized on-
track legalization
Map via locations to top tier, 
implement the top group
Placing switchboxes
Place and route bottom 
partition and RDL
Hierarchical
Fig. 7. Our CAD flow for F2F 3D ICs, implemented in Cadence Innovus.
Security-driven steps for IP protection are emphasized in bold.
F2F 3D integration—in between the two tiers, redistribu-
tion layers (RDLs) can be purposefully manufactured for
obfuscation of the vertical interconnects (Fig. 1). Doing so
only requires a trustworthy BEOL facility, which is a prac-
tical assumption given that BEOL fabrication is much less
demanding than FEOL fabrication (owing to larger pitches
and less complex processing steps). That is especially true
for higher metal layers; note that RDLs reside between the
F2F bonds which themselves are at higher layers.
Chen et al. [40] consider real and dummy vias using mag-
nesium (Mg) and magnesium-oxide (MgO), respectively, for
obfuscation of interconnects. They demonstrate that real
Mg vias oxidize quickly into MgO and, hence, can become
indistinguishable from the other MgO dummy vias during
RE. Without loss of generality, we assume our LC scheme
to be based on the use of Mg/MgO vias for obfuscating the
vertical interconnects of the 3D IC. Emerging interconnects
such as those based on carbon nanotubes [41] may become
relevant in the future as well.
5 METHODOLOGY FOR IP PROTECTION
Here we elaborate on our CAD and manufacturing flow for
F2F 3D integration. The CAD flow is in parts inspired by
Chang et al. [13], but note that we devise and implement our
customized flow, with a particular focus on IP protection
(Fig. 7). Our flow allows a concerned designer to explore
the trade-offs between PPA and cuts, i.e., the number of F2F
vertical inter-tier connections. Cuts are a crucial metric for
the security analysis, as discussed in more detail in Sec 6.4.
It is also important to note that we follow the call for
layout anonymization [10]—we purposefully do not engage
cross-tier optimization steps, to mitigate layout-level hints
on the obfuscated BEOL/RDLs.
As for the F2F process, we propose the following
security-centric modification. The wafers for the two tiers
are fabricated by one (two) untrusted foundry (foundries)
and then shipped to a trusted BEOL and stacking facility.
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This trusted facility grows the obfuscated RDLs on top of
one wafer, and continues with the regular F2F flow (i.e.,
flipping and bonding the second wafer on top).
5.1 Design Partitioning
After obtaining the post-routed 2D design, we partition the
netlist into top and bottom groups, representing the tiers of
the F2F IC. I/O ports are created for all vertical interconnects
between the two groups, representing the F2F vias. Besides
these F2F ports, we place primary I/Os at the chip bound-
ary, as in conventional 2D designs. This is also practical for
F2F integration where TSVs are to be manufactured at the
chip boundary for primary I/Os and the P/G grid.
Random partitioning: A naive way for security-driven
partitioning is to assign gates to the top/bottom groups
randomly. While doing so, the number of cuts will be
dictated by the number, type, and local inter-connectivity
of gates being assigned to one group. Since random parti-
tioning lacks any heuristic, it may either result in savings
or overheads for power and/or performance, depending on
the design, number of vertical interconnects induced, and
randomness itself.
Maximizing the cut-size: As already indicated (and
further explored in Sec 6.4), the larger the cut size, the
more difficult becomes IP piracy. Hence, here we seek to
increase the cut size as much as reasonably possible. First,
timing reports for the 2D baseline are obtained following
which gates are randomly alternated along their timing
paths toward the top/bottom groups. In the security-wise
best case—which is also the worst case regarding power
and performance—every other gate is assigned to the top
and bottom group, respectively. There, for a path with n
gates, 2n cuts are arising. In short, the trade-off is as follows:
the larger the cut size, the more resilient the design, but the
higher the layout cost. We study the impact of maximizing
the cut-size in Section 6.2
Timing-aware partitioning: Based on the insights re-
garding the cost-security trade-off for random partitioning
and maximizing cuts, here we seek to reduce layout cost
while maintaining strong protection. First, the available
timing slack is determined for each gate. Then, based on
a user-defined threshold, the critical gates remain in the
bottom tier, whereas all other gates are moved to the top tier.
This procedure is repeated with revised timing thresholds
until an even utilization for both tiers is achieved. Note
that it is difficult for an attacker to understand whether
a path in the bottom/top group is critical or not (or even
complete, for that matter). In other words, the attacker has
to tackle both groups at once and, more importantly, resolve
the randomized F2F vias and the obfuscated interconnects.
We advocate this partitioning strategy, especially for any
flat design. In the remainder of this work, timing-aware
partitioning is our default strategy unless otherwise noted.
Hierarchical partitioning: This strategy is applied for
designs with hierarchies in the top-level module. Inspired
by [13], we separate modules with a large degree of connec-
tivity across tiers, resulting in large numbers of cuts. Other
modules are partitioned/placed to balance the utilization of
both tiers. In short, this strategy serves to protect the IP as
well as to limit layout cost for hierarchical designs.
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Fig. 8. (Left) RDL randomization for switchboxes and F2F vias. (Right)
Normalized distances between to-be-connected F2F vias after random-
ization, for benchmark b17 1.
Bottom 
Tier 
RDL 
Top Tier 
Obfuscated switchbox in RDL 
Fig. 9. Obfuscated switchbox, embedded in two RDL layers, exemplarily
for bottom-to-top drivers. Each driver pin (downwards triangle) can con-
nect to any sink pin (upwards triangle). All F2F ports are aligned with
the pins of the switchbox here, for simplicity, whereas the top-tier ports
are randomized in reality.
5.2 Planning of F2F Interconnects
After placing the bottom tier, the initial locations for F2F
ports are determined in the vicinity of the drivers/sinks.
Then, a security-driven, randomized placement of F2F ports
is conducted, along with customized on-track legalization.
Next, obfuscated switchboxes are placed, and the F2F ports are
mapped to the top tier.
Randomization: It is easy to see that regular planning of
F2F interconnects cannot be secure, as this aligns the ports
for the bottom and top tier directly. That is, the untrusted
foundry has direct access to both tiers and could simply
stack them up to recover the complete design. Hence, we
randomize the arrangement of F2F ports as follows. (Fig. 8).
We place additional F2F ports randomly, yet with help of
on-track legalization (see below), in the top RDL. These
randomized ports are then routed through the RDLs toward
the original F2F ports connecting with the bottom tier. In
short, randomization of F2F vias is required to protect the
design against fab-based adversaries during manufacturing.
Obfuscated switchboxes: To further protect against RE
attacks from malicious end-users, we obfuscate the connec-
tivity in the RDLs, using a customized switchbox (Fig. 9).
This switchbox allows stealthy one-to-one mapping of four
drivers to four sinks. The essence of the switchbox is the
use of Mg/MgO vias (recall Sec. 4.2), to cloak which driver
connects to which sink. The pins of the switchbox represent
the F2F ports. The pins are aligned with the routing tracks to
enable proper utilization of routing resources. For random-
ization, the additional ports connecting with the top tier are
used for rerouting during design closure.
On-track legalization: Each F2F port is moved inside
the core boundary, toward the center point defined by all
instances connected with this port. Next, we obtain the
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closest and still-unoccupied on-track location for actual
placement. If need be, we step-wise increase the search
radius considering a user-defined threshold.
5.3 Design Closure
After the F2F via planning stage, both tiers are placed and
routed separately, independent of each other. For sequential
designs, we conduct CTS on both tiers independently, as
suggested in [35].
Recall that we do not engage in any cross-tier opti-
mization, on purpose, to anonymize the individual tiers
from each other. However, we apply intra-tier optimization.
While routing the bottom tier, we also route the randomized
and obfuscated RDL with their switchboxes. Next, we en-
capsulate the top and bottom partitions in a wrapper netlist,
and we assemble and implement the design followed by
generating a Standard Parasitic Exchange Format (SPEF) file
that captures the RC parasitics of the F2F vias (modeled as
regular vias, see below). Finally, we perform DRC checks,
evaluate the PPA, and stream out separate DEF files for the
top/bottom tiers and the RDL.
6 RESULTS FOR IP PROTECTION
6.1 Experimental Setup
Implementation and layout evaluation: Since there are
no commercial tools available yet for (F2F) 3D ICs, we
implement our CAD flow within Cadence Innovus 17.1, us-
ing custom TCL and Python scripts. Our implementation
imposes negligible design runtime overheads. We use the
NanGate 45nm library [37] for our experiments, with six
metal layers for the baseline 2D setup and six layers each for
the top and bottom tier in the F2F setup. The RDL comprises
four duplicated layers of M8, from which two are used for
embedding the obfuscated switchboxes, and two are used
for randomizing the routing. F2F vias are modeled as M6
vias; while this is an optimistic assumption, for now, F2F
technology scaling can be expected to reach such dimen-
sions. The PPA analysis is conducted for the slow process
corner, using CCS libraries at 0.95V. For power analysis, we
assume a switching activity of 0.2 for all primary inputs.
We ensure that the layouts are free of any congestion, by
choosing appropriate utilization rates for the 2D baselines.
This is essential to prevent any possible congestion to be
carried forward in our 3D flow. All experiments are carried
out on an Intel Xeon E5-4660 @ 2.2 GHz with CentOS 6.9.
For Cadence Innovus, up to 16 cores are allocated.
Setup for security evaluation: Since we promote 3D
SM, regular proximity attacks such as [15], [16] cannot be
applied. Thus, we propose and publicly release a novel
attack against 3D SM [42], also accounting for the RDL
obfuscation underlying in our scheme; see also Sec. 6.4. At-
tacks on our protected layouts are evaluated by commonly
used metrics, i.e., the correct connection rate (CCR), percentage
of netlist recovery (PNR) [18], and Hamming distance (HD).
HD is calculated using Synopsys VCS with 1,000,000 test
patterns. As for SAT-based RE attacks, we leverage the tool
provided by [29], with the related time-out set to 72 hours.
Designs: The commonly considered benchmarks from
the ISCAS-85 and ITC-99 suites are used for layout and secu-
rity analysis. In addition, we also use two SoC benchmarks:
the DARPA CEP [36] and the JPEG OpenCores design [43].
Fig. 10. Layout snapshots of bottom/top tier (left/right) for b22. The
insets show the corresponding F2F vias.
6.2 Security-Driven Layout Evaluation
Our flow allows to trade-off PPA and cuts; the latter dic-
tates the resilience against IP piracy both during and after
manufacturing. Figure 10 showcases the layout images for
benchmark b22.
6.2.1 Random Partitioning and Maximizing the Cut-Size
Initially we study random partitioning of gates, by moving
them randomly from the bottom to the top group in steps of
10%, up to 50%. As the strategy is randomized, we perform
ten runs for each benchmark for any given percentage
of gates to move. The resulting power and performance
distributions are illustrated in Fig. 11.
Interestingly, even for the security-wise best case of
randomly moving 50% of the gates, some runs still provide
better power and/or performance than the 2D baseline. The
savings in performance can be attributed to the fact that,
when splitting the design across the vertical dimension, we
can obtain a reduction in wirelength, which helps to im-
prove timing. We note that these improvements, on average,
come at some expense of power, with related overheads in
the range of 0–7% for lifting/moving 50% of gates.
While this demonstrates the potential for naive random
partitioning, it is important to note that this finding only
holds true as long as we refrain from randomizing the
F2F ports and from using the obfuscated switchboxes for
these experiments. In fact, once we seek to maximize the
cuts, along with randomization of F2F ports and use of
switchboxes, larger ITC-99 benchmarks such as b18 1 incur
considerable overheads of up to 60% (Fig. 12). Here we
also observe that large cut-sizes lead to an increase in
routing congestion and total wirelength, thereby further
increasing the total capacitance of the design. This offsets
the performance benefits which regular, security-oblivious
3D integration can be expected to achieve [12].
In short, although these strategies offer strong resilience,
a more aggressive PPA-security trade-off may be desired.
6.2.2 Timing-Aware Partitioning
This setup tackles that need for achieving security while
maintaining reasonable PPA cost. We observe that even for
larger ITC-99 benchmarks such as b18 1 and b19 (Fig. 13),
there are some benefits when comparing the secure 3D
designs to their 2D baseline. As explained in Sec. 5.1, since
the most timing-critical gates are constrained to one tier, we
induce significantly less cuts along the timing paths for the
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Fig. 11. Impact of randomly assigning gates on performance (top) and power (bottom). Each boxplot represents ten runs. Note that the same
benchmarks are applied for the top and bottom plots; benchmark labels are accordingly placed between those plots.
b17_1 b18 b18_1 b19 b20 b21 b22
10
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
P
e
rf
o
rm
a
n
ce
 O
ve
rh
e
a
d
s 
(%
)
b17_1 b18 b18_1 b19 b20 b21 b22
10
0
10
20
30
40
50
P
o
w
e
r 
O
ve
rh
e
a
d
s 
(%
)
Fig. 12. Layout cost for maximizing cuts, with 35–50% of the gates
moved, and with obfuscated switchboxes and F2F randomization being
applied. Each boxplot represents ten runs.
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Fig. 13. Performance, power cost for timing-aware setup with obfuscated
switchboxes and F2F randomization. Each box represents ten runs.
3D design. For example, we observe a reduction of about
60% in timing-path cuts for ITC-99 benchmarks b18 1 and
b19 when compared to random partitioning. To demonstrate
the security implication of this setup, we plot the normal-
ized distances between to-be-connected F2F vias in Fig. 8.
This figure shows a wide variation across the inter-tier nets,
whereas for regular, unprotected F2F stacking the distances
would be all zero. Overall, the choice of partitioning lies
with the designer, which she/he can trade-off considering
security and PPA cost, but timing-aware partitioning should
be considered first, i.e., at least for non-hierarchical designs.
6.2.3 Case Study on CEP and JPEG
Besides the well-known benchmarks considered above, we
also conduct case studies on two “real-world netlists,” the
DARPA CEP [36] and the JPEG OpenCores design [43].
Thus, we also demonstrate our secure end-to-end CAD flow
for practical 3D ICs.
Setup: The utilization is set to 70% and 60% for CEP
and JPEG, respectively, which ensures that the 2D baseline
designs are devoid of any congestion. We use the NanGate
45nm library [37]. F2F vias are modeled as M10 vias. All 2D
and 3D designs operate at iso-performance, with a timing
constraint of 5ns (i.e., at 200 MHz). Further details are the
same as in Sec. 6.1.
Results: The results for the 2D baseline and secure 3D
designs are provided in Table 4. Regarding the footprint
area/die outlines, both the secure 3D designs provide sav-
ings over their 2D baselines, namely 49.3% for CEP and
42% for JPEG. Regarding instance counts, we observe some
overheads for both the secure 3D designs; as we do not
apply any cross-tier and/or post-partitioning optimization,
there is less leverage to reduce instance counts for the tools.
Again, for regular, security-oblivious 3D F2F integration,
one would expect savings/reductions in both wirelength
and instance count, which ultimately also enables power
savings [12].
For our security-driven 3D flow, it depends on various
aspects whether there are power/performance savings or
overheads. First, recall that we randomize F2F vias and
leverage obfuscated switchboxes (to deter fab-based adver-
saries and malicious end-users, respectively), which tends
to increases wirelength, and thereby the driver strengths
and/or buffer counts. Second, the designs have some impact
by themselves. For example, for JPEG we note 8.72% higher
power consumption, whereas for CEP we note a 6.49%
power reduction. Third, partitioning plays an important
role as well, as already discussed. Since CEP and JPEG are
both hierarchical designs, we apply hierarchical partitioning
here, which fully protects the system-level IP orchestration
and any glue logic. To further protect individual modules,
we can split them up across the two tiers; which modules
to select and how to split is the designer’s decision, also
depending on the nature of the modules and the overall
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TABLE 4
Comparison between 2D baseline designs and their secure 3D F2F
counterparts of CEP [36] and JPEG [43]. All results are for
iso-performance (5ns). Wirelengths in 3D are subject to randomization
of F2F vias.
Metrics CEP JPEG
2D 3D 2D 3D
Footprint (µm2) 2,332,429 1,180,807 1,317,041 763,945
F2F Via Count 0 6,447 0 6,707
Total Cell Count 852,496 859,207 497,666 520,374
Total Wirelength (m) 26.62 23.08 8.69 9.58
Total Power (mW ) 417.8 390.7 204.1 221.9
design [39]. Toward this end, we also performed an exper-
iment on CEP where individual modules were partitioned,
resulting in 20,863 F2F vias (3.25× than those reported in
Table 4). We maintain that both tiers are DRC-clean and free
of congestion. We observe power and timing overheads of
9.59% and 13.64%, respectively, which implies that this 3D
design can operate at around 176 MHz. Running the overall
chip at this frequency also ensures that there is no loss in
system functionality. Finally, note that the number of cuts
we obtain here indicates strong resilience of the 3D designs;
we discuss this further in Sec. 6.4.
6.3 Comparison with Prior Art
LC schemes: Among others, threshold-voltage-dependent
LC is gaining traction. Although promising concerning re-
silience, the PPA cost are considerable. For example, Akkaya
et al. [27] report overheads of 9.2×, 6.6×, and 3.3× for
PPA, respectively, when compared to conventional 2-input
NAND gate. Nirmala et al. [26] report 11.2× and 10.5× cost
for power and area, respectively. Besides, for interconnects
camouflaging, Patnaik et al. [28] report PPA overheads of
4.9%, 31.2%, and 25% for ITC-99 benchmark b17 at 60%
LC. When compared to these schemes, we can provide
significantly better PPA (except for [28] concerning power).
Regarding prior art on 3D LC [22], [23], recall that they
require a trusted FEOL facility; hence, their schemes are not
directly comparable to ours. Also, at the time of writing,
their libraries and protected designs were not available to us
for a detailed study. Moreover, for [22], the authors leverage
regular 2D LC schemes while using different technology
nodes. Depending on the particular node and LC scheme,
this may induce large PPA overheads, and technology-
heterogeneous 3D integration may hold further complica-
tions [14], [35]. Recall that these concerns were our main
motivation to advocate the use of uniform/same technolo-
gies and camouflaging of vertical interconnects.
SM schemes: In Table 5, we compare with studies on 2D
SM. Overall, the placement-centric techniques by Wang et
al. [16] are competitive concerning power and performance.
However, as always the case for regular SM, they can only
avert fab-based adversaries, but not malicious end-users.
In Table 6, we compare with the security-driven 2.5D
integration scheme by Xie et al. [21]. Their work is relevant
as they propose a similar notion of security based on cut
sizes. For the benchmarks the authors considered, we obtain
on average 53% more cuts in our scheme. (For our cut sizes
on larger benchmarks, refer to Table 7). Regarding PPA,
we observe significantly lower costs than [21].5 Besides, as
with regular SM, their 2.5D scheme is not inherently resilient
against malicious end-users, but our 3D scheme is.
6.4 Security Analysis and Attacks
6.4.1 Our Proximity Attack for 3D SM
To the best of our knowledge, there is no attack yet in the
literature which can account for 3D SM in the context of IP
piracy. Hence, we propose and implement such an attack,
with a focus on one untrusted foundry (or two colluding
foundries) and our RDL obfuscation. We provide this attack
as a public release in [42].
We assume that the attacker holds the layout files for
the top and bottom tier, but, residing in the untrusted
fab, she/he has no access to the trusted RDL.6 Although
she/he understands how many drivers are connecting from
the bottom to the top tier and vice versa, she/he does
not know which driver connects to which sink, given the
randomization of F2F vias. Recall that, we do not engage in
cross-tier optimization, to mitigate any layout-level hints.
Let us assume there are dbot drivers in the bottom and,
independently, dtop drivers in the top tier. Since we do
not allow for fan-outs within the RDL (this would occupy
more F2F vias than necessary), there are only one-to-one
mappings—this results in dbot! × dtop! possible netlists.
Once switchboxes are used, however, the attacker can tackle
groups of four drivers/sinks at once. Still, she/he has to
resolve (a) which four top-tier drivers are connected to
which four bottom-tier sinks and vice versa, and (b) the con-
nectivity within the obfuscated switchboxes. For those cases,
there are 4!×((1/4× dbot)!× (1/4× dtop)!) possible netlists
remaining. Next, we outline the corresponding heuristics at
the heart of our attack.
1) Unique mappings: Any driver in the bottom/top
tier will feed only one sink in the top/bottom
tier. Hence, an attacker will reconnect drivers and
sinks individually. Moreover, she/he can identify
all primary I/Os as they are implemented using
wirebonds or TSVs, not randomized F2F vias.
2) Layout hints: Although the F2F vias are randomized,
the attacker may try to correlate the proximity and
orientation of F2F vias with their corresponding
RDL connectivity. Toward this end, she/he can also
investigate the routing toward the switchbox ports.
Moreover, recalling the practical threat model, the
attacker may be able to identify some known IP
and confine the related sets of candidate F2F inter-
connects accordingly. Our attack is generic and can
account for those scenarios, by keeping track of the
candidate F2F pairings considered by the attacker.
3) Combinatorial loops: Both tiers and thus all active
components are available to the attacker, hence
5. Concerning area, note that we report on die outlines, which is
standard practice for 3D studies. Accordingly, for our result of -50%,
the 3D IC and the 2D baseline require the same total silicon area. In
other words, we incur 0% additional area cost. While Xie et al. report on
additional area cost, they omit that their scheme requires an interposer
which—being at least as large as the chips stacked onto it—incurs
≥100% cost. Still, when only comprising metal layers, we acknowledge
that an interposer is less expensive than regular chips.
6. We discuss the implications for malicious end-users being able to
access the obfuscated RDL further below.
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TABLE 5
PPA cost comparison with 2D SM protection schemes. Numbers are in % and quoted from the respective publications.
Benchmark BEOL+Physical [16] Logic+Physical [16] Logic+Logic [16] Concerted Lifting [18] Proposed with Random Partitioning
Area Power Delay Area Power Delay Area Power Delay Area Power Delay Area∗ Power Delay
c432 N/A 0.17 0.49 N/A 0.44 0.24 N/A 0.17 0.21 7.7 13.1 11.6 -50 -2.66 0.31
c880 N/A 0.25 0.05 N/A 0.35 0.03 N/A -0.05 -0.09 0 12.1 19.9 -50 0.97 1.6
c1355 N/A 0.52 0.57 N/A 0.75 0.42 N/A 0.03 0.01 0 12.2 21.3 -50 1.83 0.38
c1908 N/A 1.1 1.3 N/A 1.1 0.23 N/A 0.45 0.39 7.7 14.6 18.9 -50 0.11 1.69
c2670 N/A 0.29 0.27 N/A 0.29 0.27 N/A 0.05 0.03 7.7 10 12 -50 -2.18 3.32
c3540 N/A 0.53 0.28 N/A 0.36 0.02 N/A 0.14 -0.02 7.7 5 2.8 -50 0.59 4.32
c5315 N/A 0.19 -0.01 N/A 0.67 0.08 N/A 0.29 -0.01 7.7 7.9 16.9 -50 -1.66 4.73
c6288 N/A 0.29 0.19 N/A 0 0 N/A 0.1 0.67 27.3 12.3 15.7 -50 10.43 10.21
c7552 N/A 0.28 -0.36 N/A 0.35 -0.05 N/A 0.56 1.77 16.7 9.3 15.7 -50 10.57 8.21
Average N/A 0.4 0.31 N/A 0.48 0.14 N/A 0.19 0.33 9.2 10.7 15 -50 2 3.86
∗Following the standard practice for 3D studies, we report on area by considering individual die outlines. In [18], area is reported in terms of die
outlines as well.
TABLE 6
Comparison with 2.5D scheme of [21]. PPA is in contrast to a 2D
baseline, numbers are in %. See also Footnote 5 on area cost.
Benchmark Xie et al. [21] (SC+SP) Proposed with Random Partitioning
Cut Size Area Power Delay Cut Size Area Power Delay
c432 130 1 17.6 5.9 134 -50 (0) -2.66 0.31
c880 141 0 29.4 10 138 -50 (0) 0.97 1.6
c1355 130 0 17.6 17.6 91 -50 (0) 1.83 0.38
c1908 132 1 11.8 29.4 149 -50 (0) 0.11 1.69
c2670 152 0 11.8 5.9 154 -50 (0) -2.18 3.32
c3540 133 0 5.9 5.9 349 -50 (0) 0.59 4.32
c7552 157 1 1 5.9 477 -50 (0) 10.57 8.21
Average 139 0.4 13.6 11.5 213 -50 (0) 1.32 2.83
TABLE 7
Cut sizes and average attack runtimes. Time-out ‘t-o’ is 72 hours.
Benchmark Cut Sizes SAT Attack [29] Proposed Attack
Random Timing-Aware Runtime (Min.) Runtime (Sec.)
c432 134 56 624 0.004
c880 138 53 642 0.003
c1355 91 37 492 0.07
c3540 349 97 948 8.73
b17 1 6,650 2,482 t-o 0.25
b18 15,974 6,906 t-o 113.51
b18 1 16,706 6,616 t-o 4.62
b19 33,417 13,142 t-o 0.53
she/he can readily exclude those F2F connections
inducing combinatorial loops.
The results in Table 7 indicate the efficiency of our
proposed proximity attack (especially over the SAT-based
attack [29], see below for that scenario). Here we assume
that the attacker is able to infer all the driver-sink pairings
for the switchboxes correctly; only the obfuscation within
switchboxes remain to be attacked. This is a strong assump-
tion and, hence, rendering our evaluation conservative. In
fact, this scenario can be considered as an optimal proximity
attack, as for all F2F connections the correct one is always
among the considered candidates. With regards to CCR,
PNR, and HD for the recovered netlists, our protection
scheme can be considered as reasonably secure (Fig. 14).
Although PNR, which represents the degree of similarity
between the original and the recovered netlist [18], is around
30% or more for most benchmarks, HD approaches the ideal
value of 50% for most benchmarks. In other words, although
our attack can correctly recover some parts of the design, the
overall functionality still remains obscured.
6.4.2 SAT-Based Attacks
After manufacturing, the attacker can readily understand
which four drivers/sinks are connected through the switch-
boxes, but she/he still has to resolve the obfuscation within
the switchboxes themselves. The attacker may now leverage
a working copy as an oracle and launch a SAT attack.
Toward that end, we employ the attack proposed in [29],
and we model the problem using multiplexers. Empirical
results are given in Table 7. As expected, the SAT-based
attack succeeds for smaller designs but runs into time-out
for larger designs. This finding is also consistent with those
reported by Xie et al. [21] for their security-driven 2.5D
scheme, which has a security notion similar to our work.
7 METHODOLOGY FOR TROJAN PREVENTION
So far we have leveraged the potential of 3D integration
for IP protection. As elucidated earlier, insertion of hard-
ware Trojans (HTs) by an untrustworthy foundry is another
concerning threat. Security schemes like SM can hinder
those adversaries from obtaining and fully understanding
the netlist; hence, the adversaries may fail to insert HTs
at particular targeted locations. However, there are many
other parties in an IC supply chain which may leak the
netlist to those fab-based adversaries. Therefore, following a
strong threat model [10], [11] (reviewed next), we leverage 3D
integration to hinder such an advanced HT threat scenario.
7.1 Strong Threat Model
The security guarantee of k-security, as proposed by Imeson
et al. [10] is as follows. Given a k-secure FEOL layout and
the complete, final gate-level netlist (just before splitting
into FEOL/BEOL), an attacker has only a chance of 1/k
for successful HT insertion into a particular location (or an
up to k times higher risk for having ≤ k HTs detected by
subsequent inspection). To achieve this, the idea is to induce
k isomorphic structures in the FEOL by carefully lifting
wires to the BEOL. As a result, an attacker cannot uniquely
map these k structures to the target in the netlist, but can
only randomly guess with a probability of 1/k (Fig. 15).
Imeson et al. [10] developed a greedy heuristic to select wires
to be lifted to the BEOL, and also apply SAT to compute the
security level, i.e., the minimal degree of isomorphism for
any cell type found in the whole FEOL layout.
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Fig. 14. Percentage of netlist recovery (PNR) [18], Hamming distance (HD), and correct connection rates (CCR), when the benchmarks are
subjected to our 3D SM proximity attack [42]. Each box represents ten runs.
??
??
k-secure FEOL
k-security
Netlist with Targets X
X
X
Fig. 15. k-security is to apply split manufacturing and purposefully lift
wires to the BEOL (indicated by dashed wires) such that FEOL-based
attackers cannot uniquely identify some or any parts of the netlist avail-
able to them. Hence, targeted Trojan insertion becomes difficult. Here,
with security level two, an attacker has a 50% chance each for correctly
inserting Trojans into the targeted OR and NOR-NAND structures.
7.1.1 Discussion of Prior Art
Although it provides a formal foundation against HT inser-
tion, k-security [10] has practical shortcomings as follows.
“-” The security level hinges on the underlying compo-
sition of gates which, in turn, is dictated by logical
synthesis. The fewer the instances of some gate
type in the FEOL, the lower the overall security
level. That is because k-security is defined as the
minimum security level across all gate types. The
technology library plays a key role here as well—
the “richer” the library in terms of gate types, the
lower the average counts for some individual types,
and the lower the overall security level. We report
on this correlation in Table 8. In short, being agnostic
to synthesis, [10] is at the mercy of the design tools.
“-” The reported layout cost is considerable. For the
ISCAS-85 benchmark c432, for security level 8, the
overheads are already 61%, 82%, and 207% for PPA,
respectively. Hence, applying k-security on large de-
signs can become prohibitive.
“-” Computing the security level is NP-complete and
related to the problem of subgraph isomorphism.
Imeson et al. [10] leverage SAT solvers and circuit
partitioning to limit the computational cost. Still,
we note that the authors did not investigate large-
scale benchmarks with hundreds of thousands of
gates. Also, while circuit partitioning is a common
practice, here it hinders to explore the security for
the whole netlist holistically, as sub-circuits can only
be secured individually after partitioning.
“-” Imeson et al. [10] delegate only wires but no gates to
the trusted 2.5D facility. This approach is the same
as with classical SM in 2D ICs, hence the complete
potential of 3D integration is not utilized.
Li et al. [11] recently proposed an advancement for k-
security, with the following contributions (labeled as “+”).
Despite the advances proposed in [11], there are also some
limitations (labeled as “-”).
“+” Additional dummy gates (and dummy wires) help
to raise the security level as required for layouts
initially holding only a few instances of some gate
type. To model the insertion of dummy gates and
simultaneous lifting of wires, Li et al. [11] consider
the concept of spanning subgraph isomorphism.
“+” To limit computational cost, they propose a mixed-
integer linear program (MILP)-based framework.
“+” To limit layout cost, they protect only selected vul-
nerable gates in the layout, not the whole design.
They further impose a close but uniform arrange-
ment of isomorphic instances, to limit placement
disturbances without leaking layout-level hints.
“-” As with Imeson et al. [10], Li et al. [11] apply par-
titioning on larger netlists, effectively hindering to
secure industrial designs in their entirety. Also, Li et
al. [11] do not investigate any large-scale designs.
“-” While Li et al. [11] may raise the security level
using dummy gates (and dummy wires), these gates
can impose significant area overheads (and timing
overheads, due to routing congestion when having
to lift all related wires). We report on the PPA impact
for adding dummy gates/wires in Table 9. For the
ITC-99 benchmark b17 1, for security level 20, there
are up to 1.2× more gates and 5.2× more wires
when compared to the unprotected designs.7
“-” Li et al. do not utilize the potential of 3D integration.
In short, Imeson et al. [10] and Li et al. [11] provide a solid
formal foundation to protect against targeted HT insertion,
but there are practical limitations to both schemes.
7.1.2 Our Contributions
Here we tackle all the outlined shortcomings of [10], [11].
There are two key pillars for our work: (i) a security-driven
synthesis strategy and (ii) an end-to-end CAD flow for
preventing HTs in 3D ICs. The motivation for a security-
driven synthesis strategy is that [10], [11] implement their
protection on top of a given netlist, solely as an afterthought.
In contrast, by delegating the construction of isomorphic
structures to the synthesis stage, we effectively render the
protection against HTs a design-time priority. Besides, our
7. In [10] it is only mandated that each vulnerable gate shall have k−1
isomorphic instances, whereas Li et al. [11] further require that none of
these instances are vulnerable themselves which, arguably, provides
a more stringent security notion. Dummy gates/wires are necessary
for this purpose, to compensate whenever some of the isomorphic
instances are vulnerable themselves. In this work, we follow the notion
of [10] while our methods can be easily tailored toward [11] as well.
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TABLE 8
Gate composition dictating k-security level for various benchmarks under different libraries as in [10]. All gates have driving strength X1. The
maximal security levels equal the minimum count across the libraries’ gate types (marked in boldface); the actual level may be lower.
Benchmark lib-3 lib-4 lib-5 lib-7
NOR2 NAND2 INV NOR2 NAND3 NAND2 INV NOR3 NOR2 NAND3 NAND2 INV NOR4 NOR3 NOR2 NAND4 NAND3 NAND2 INV
c432 61 69 30 43 14 65 24 15 37 9 50 29 5 9 45 5 5 37 31
c7552 461 967 538 244 158 986 586 36 227 126 985 527 2 7 230 59 179 940 523
b14 806 3,094 1,282 450 422 2,503 1,092 86 370 362 2,587 1,151 7 17 259 88 303 2,598 1,122
b17 1 7,097 12,909 4,206 5,549 3,179 8,500 4,195 1,440 4,806 2,462 7,759 4,454 281 585 3,733 1,070 1,394 8,533 4,339
b22 2,405 10,818 4,618 1,433 1,458 9,129 4,093 223 1,398 1,347 8,599 3,953 71 92 1,183 361 1,033 8,823 3,825
TABLE 9
Study on [11], netlists provided as courtesy by the authors of [11]. Setup lib-3 is as in Table 8, and lib-8 contains NAND2, NOR2, AND2, OR2,
XOR2, XNOR2, INV, and BUF, all in X1 strength. Left: number of gates and wires for original, unprotected layouts. Right: number of additional
dummy gates (D. Gates) and lifted wires (L. Wires) for security levels 10 (S10) and 20 (S20) when 10% of original gates are considered vulnerable.
Benchmark lib-3 (Original) lib-8 (Original) lib-3 (S10) lib-8 (S10) lib-3 (S20) lib-8 (S20)
Gates Wires Gates Wires D. Gates L. Wires D. Gates L. Wires D. Gates L. Wires D. Gates L. Wires
b14 5,182 5,457 4,125 4,400 3,620 12,600 4,706 14,892 7,819 25,012 9,885 29,737
b15 1 7,722 8,207 6,978 7,463 6,422 21,480 7,185 22,205 13,708 43,124 15,246 44,306
b17 1 24,212 25,664 21,500 22,952 19,988 66,271 22,648 71,341 42,216 132,153 47,867 142,487
b20 11,810 12,332 10,686 9,226 8,340 27,818 9,748 33,661 17,808 55,602 22,405 67,044
b22 17,841 18,608 14,457 15,224 12,923 44,153 16,333 50,858 27,299 87,915 34,284 101,352
end-to-end CAD flow for 3D ICs, extended from the earlier
part of this work, effectively raises the notion of k-security
toward practical application for preventing HT insertion in
large-scale designs.
7.2 Security-Driven Synthesis Stage
The essence of our security-driven synthesis strategy is as
follows. For any netlist, we state that the designer can
identify the structures vulnerable to HT insertion (e.g., by
vulnerability analysis [11], [44]) and wants to protect them
accordingly. In agreement with k-security, the designer then
intends to induce many isomorphic instances of those struc-
tures in the FEOL. To take control of the layout cost, but also
to advance scalability and the attainable level of security, we
delegate this step of inducing isomorphic instances to the
synthesis stage. This way, our approach can be considered
as “secure by construction.”8 We provide more details for
the synthesis stage in Fig. 16 and below.
Based on some vulnerability analysis of choice [11], [44],
the designer first identifies the vulnerable gates/structures.
In this study, we leverage [11] to identify various structures
which are covering the vulnerable gates as well as some sur-
rounding gates (Fig. 17). It is understood that the designer
can investigate as many structures as desired regarding
(i) layout cost, (ii) the potential for inducing isomorphic
instances, and (iii) the coverage of vulnerable gates. In fact,
we explored in total 18 structures; the ones illustrated in
Fig. 17 are the most promising ones for our empirical study.9
Next, these structures are prepared for synthesis, i.e.,
they are defined as custom cells. Typically, one has to conduct
library characterization when creating custom cells, but here
we can refrain from this effort. That is because we decompose
the structures again later on, i.e., we transform them back
into their corresponding arrangement of simple two-input
8. Although we do modify the netlist, we still assume—in agreement
with [10], [11]—that the attacker holds the final gate-level netlist,
truthfully representing our security-driven synthesis stage. As a result,
we do not imply security through obscurity.
9. See Sec. 8.1 for the layout cost of all the 18 structures investigated.
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Fig. 16. Our CAD flow for F2F 3D ICs, with security-driven steps for
preventing HT insertion emphasized in bold.
cells. It is essential, however, to track and preserve all gates
related to the decomposed structures, by setting them as
“don’t touch,” such that the design tools cannot interfere
with these gates. We also keep track of the input/output
wires of the structures, which have to be lifted later on to
the BEOL to achieve k-security. Now, instead of library char-
acterization, we leverage the characteristics of simple cells
available in the library (e.g., NAND with the same number
of inputs as the structure), but we adapt the Boolean func-
tionality as needed. We note that utilizing the characteristics
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(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g)
Fig. 17. The seven structures considered in this work without loss of generality. They are constructed based on the vulnerability analysis of [11].
of simple cells saves not only effort but also “tricks” the
synthesis tool, at least to some degree, into using more in-
stances for those structures (see also Sec. 8.1, Table 10). That
is presumably because the structures provide some complex
Boolean functionality with little, indeed over-optimistic lay-
out cost. With our iterative synthesis approach, we can thus
impose more instances of the various structures as needed,
while also correctly gauging the anticipated layout cost (by
decomposing the structures).
Once the synthesis iterations are completed, which is
upon the designer to decide and should be based on the
security level and/or synthesis-level PPA cost, the vulner-
ability of the final netlist is to be re-evaluated. The final
security level hinges on how many vulnerable gates are
covered by the isomorphic instances of all structures.
7.3 End-to-End CAD Flow
As indicated, our 3D IC CAD flow for preventing targeted
HT insertion is extended from the earlier part of this work.
However, there are some differences as follows.
1) Since the threat of HT insertion applies exclu-
sively to manufacturing time, we do not require
LC/obfuscation for the RDL. However, we require
randomization of the routing paths within the RDL.
2) k-security is applied initially, to the whole netlist at
once, using our security-driven synthesis strategy.
3) Our flow comprises techniques similar to those re-
quired for regular SM. More specifically, we lever-
age our customized lifting cells [18] to lift wires to
the RDL as dictated by k-security.
Our flow enables the concerned designer to tackle both
layout cost and resilience against HT insertion. To do so,
we integrate our security-driven synthesis strategy as a key
stage for the overall flow (Fig. 16). Further steps in our flow
are partitioning, planning of F2F vias, and placement and
SM-aware routing. We provide some details below.
Design partitioning: After conducting the security-
driven synthesis strategy, we place and route the 2D design.
The resulting netlist is partitioned into two groups, repre-
senting the top and bottom tiers of the F2F 3D IC. We define
I/O ports for wires crossing the two tiers after partitioning;
these ports become F2F vias later on.
As for the impact of 3D partitioning on k-security, it
is important to note the following. First, we ensure that
all the gates of any decomposed isomorphic instance stay
together in one tier. Second, since we apply the synthesis
strategy on the complete netlist, i.e., before partitioning,
there is no inherent limitation for isomorphic instances.
Third, partitioning itself may, however, still impact the final
security level. That is because once an attacker can retake the
same partitioning steps as the designer, the attacker can also
infer which subset of isomorphic instances goes into which
tier. It is easy to see that fully random partitioning would
render this attacker’s benefit void, but we found that this
can impose considerable layout cost. Based on Sec. 5.1, we
therefore propose a customized timing-driven and security-
aware partitioning technique as follows.
First, we obtain the timing reports for the 2D base-
line layout. Then, each critical timing path without any
isomorphic instances is kept within one tier. Other paths,
i.e., paths with some isomorphic instances or non-critical
paths, are randomly partitioned across the two tiers. With
this partitioning technique, the attacker cannot understand
which isomorphic instances in the bottom/top tier relate to
which in the netlist—the definition of the security level as
in [10] is maintained.
Planning of F2F interconnects: These steps are primarily
the same as in Sec. 5.2, in particular, the randomization of
F2F ports and the custom on-track legalization, but here we
can refrain from implementing obfuscated switchboxes.
Wire lifting and design closure: Next, both tiers are
placed and routed separately. In the absence of the obfus-
cated switchboxes leveraged for routing the RDL in Sec. 5.3,
here we re-tailor our custom lifting cells [18] to enable wire-
lifting as required for k-security. That is, while routing the
top/bottom tier, we route the regular metal layers, lift wires
to the RDL with the help of the lifting cells, and route
the RDL. For design closure, the top and bottom tiers are
wrapped into one netlist. Again, we purposefully do not
engage in any optimization across tiers, to maintain anonymized
layouts. As in Sec 5.3, we derive the SPEF from the wrapper
netlist to capture the RC parasitics of F2F vias, and we
evaluate the final layout cost.
8 RESULTS FOR TROJAN PREVENTION
The setup is the same as in Sec. 6, except that two M8 layers
are used for the RDL. That is also because without the need
for obfuscated switchboxes, the RDL is less complex.
8.1 Analysis of the Security-Driven Synthesis Stage
During the iterative, security-driven synthesis stage, note
that we fix/preserve all gates of any isomorphic structure.
We observe that doing so helps to guide the logical syn-
thesis toward the remaining parts of the netlist not yet
covered by some structures; we can increase the instance
counts within a reasonable runtime. Since the synthesis
iterations require only a few minutes for all the commonly
considered benchmarks (e.g., 25–45 minutes even for ITC-
99), we additionally explore the large-scale IBM superblue
benchmarks for scalability of our synthesis strategy (Fig. 18).
Here we observe that our strategy still impose only little
runtime cost, about 6.3% on average for the first iteration,
and runtimes for successive iterations are further reducing.
In Table 10, we report on isomorphic instances and their
coverage for various benchmarks, based on 10% of all gates
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TABLE 10
Isomorphic instances of structures as in Fig. 17, netlist coverage, and final security level k for the iterative re-synthesis.
Benchmark Iteration 1 Iteration 5 Design Coverage, Security Level After Iteration 5
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (a)–(g) Gates Covered Total Gates Coverage k
b14 89 39 16 79 151 29 1 137 43 30 164 179 65 33 651 1,780 5,061 35.17% 30
b15 1 319 106 37 93 178 73 117 365 112 46 139 206 80 138 1,086 3,018 7,639 39.51% 46
b17 1 1,140 309 127 318 485 161 388 1,239 333 164 424 532 207 442 3,341 9,173 23,912 38.36% 164
b18 2,170 778 411 612 1,097 487 952 2,583 870 576 1,046 1,243 712 1,156 8,186 23,373 67,775 34.49% 576
b19 5,011 1,558 939 1,320 2,422 1,174 1,669 5,809 1,745 1,221 2,420 2,832 1,762 2,073 17,862 50,413 140,176 35.96% 1,221
b20 164 85 27 206 208 86 0 308 99 70 425 277 180 72 1,431 3,882 11,116 34.92% 70
b22 249 85 47 345 340 149 7 453 108 114 727 454 325 124 2,305 6,298 16,941 37.18% 108
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Fig. 18. Runtime comparison for regular synthesis and our security-
driven synthesis strategy for large-scale IBM superblue benchmarks.
being identified as vulnerable ones [11]. We find that large
parts of the netlists can be covered by isomorphic instances
already after a few synthesis iterations, namely 36.5%, on
average, after five iterations. This coverage provides strong
protection beyond the 10% of gates targeted. For the large-
scale IBM superblue benchmarks (not illustrated in Table 10)
the coverage is even higher, at 59%, on average. Although
we seek to cover all the gates which have been initially iden-
tified as vulnerable ones, some of those gates may not be
covered in the final netlist, due to the iterative re-synthesis
runs. We found that this effect is acceptable; of the 10%
identified gates, there are 9% covered on average. Besides,
we note that few of the critical paths contain isomorphic
instances to begin with. That is because critical paths rarely
contain vulnerable gates [11], [44]; related Trojans would be
easy to detect by delay testing.
As for security levels following the definition in [10], we
can achieve significant levels already after the fifth iteration,
ranging from 30 for ITC-99 benchmarks b14 up to 1,221 for
b19. Based on the counts of individual instances, one may
also revisit the synthesis after ruling out some structures
which tend to limit the security levels, e.g., structure (c)
for Table 10. Hence, our strategy provides margin to the
designer for both cases when lower levels are sufficient or
higher levels are desired.
In Table 11, we report on the impact of some synthesis
iterations and the final 2D layout cost. For the latter, wire-
lifting toward the BEOL as required by k-security is already
accounted for. Overall, layout costs are acceptable; that is
especially true when qualitatively comparing to [10], where
already notably smaller benchmarks induced significant
PPA cost. That is also because we can safely apply buffer
insertion to tackle timing degradation, as can be seen below.
As foreclosed, we also provide the distribution of layout
cost for all 18 different structures we explored in Fig. 19.
There we contrast the re-synthesized netlists without any
optimization to those after buffer insertion. Since all isomor-
phic instances are preserved, buffer insertion cannot inter-
fere with those structures and security is not undermined. This
simple technique helps to avoid large cost while “tricking”
synthesis into using our custom cells; it forms the baseline
for the remaining, 3D-centric experiments in Sec. 8.2
Finally, since ours is the first to consider large-scale
benchmarks for k-security, a direct comparison with prior
works [10], [11] is impractical. For a qualitative comparison,
our work allows for superior security levels, induces little
layout cost, and is scalable, all by means of synthesis.
8.2 3D IC Layout Cost and Security Analysis
In Table 12, we report on the final layout cost for the F2F 3D
ICs. Overall, costs are better than for the 2D setup (Table 11),
especially for larger benchmarks. This key finding attests
our objective to advance k-security for large-scale designs. In
Fig. 20, we showcase the layouts for ITC-99 benchmark b18.
We also report on security levels in Table 12. The levels
in 3D are the same as in 2D—as explained above, our 3D
partitioning does not undermine security. In general, few if
any proper attacks on k-security are available yet, and this is
because the underlying notion of k-isomorphism is formally
secure [45]. This also implies that otherwise effective attacks
will not be applicable. For example, although we can tackle
the missing RDL connections using a SAT attack as [29]—
the netlist available to the adversary can serve as “virtual
oracle” here—doing so is not practical. First, as we show in
Table 12, SAT attacks become computationally expensive for
large designs. Second, while a SAT attack may eventually
provide a functionally equivalent assignment for the RDL
connectivity, they cannot provide the structurally equivalent
assignment required for attacking k-security any better than
random guessing would.
9 CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
In this work, we demonstrate in detail how 3D integration
is a naturally strong match to combine split manufacturing
and camouflaging. In particular, we promote “3D splitting”
a design across multiple tiers along with randomization
and camouflaging of the vertical interconnects between the
tiers. By doing so, we propose a modern approach to (i) IP
protection and (ii) prevention of targeted Trojan insertion.
Using industrial tools and know-how, we develop
security-driven CAD flows for face-to-face (F2F) 3D ICs,
allowing us to tackle these two essential hardware security
challenges. Among other steps, we propose several security-
driven partitioning techniques, randomized planning of F2F
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TABLE 11
Gate counts and associated layout cost. Final layout-level cost account for wire-lifting (WL) in 2D. All cost are in % and with respect to the 2D
baseline. A refers to area, P to power, and D to delay.
Benchmark Iteration 1 Iteration 2 Iteration 3 Iteration 4 Iteration 5 Final (with WL)
Gates A P D Gates A P D Gates A P D Gates A P D Gates A P D A P D
b14 4,471 8.66 13.65 5.03 4,683 12.78 19.11 5.10 4,938 18.6 26.6 5.4 4,967 19.72 27.7 5.14 5,061 21.62 28.64 8.75 21.62 62.36 55.65
b15 1 7,535 11.23 8.17 7.7 7,622 12.67 10.95 7.58 7,640 13.33 12.87 7.6 7,658 14.39 13.12 7.65 7,722 16.25 15.23 7.84 16.25 43.24 61.65
b17 1 23,491 13.21 11.67 7.55 23,876 14.94 14.07 8.05 23,960 15.00 15.57 7.54 24,250 15.58 19.15 9.03 25,112 18.95 23.18 15.5 93.95 58.96 63.54
b18 64,417 6.51 -10.87 17.64 66,222 9.32 3.47 17.57 67,134 10.01 4.04 14.74 67,671 11.68 7.06 16.08 67,775 12.66 8.14 15.67 112.66 41.48 75.18
b19 134,634 0.47 -29.9 24.27 137,478 2.73 -15.36 21.75 139,032 3.02 -13.94 20.61 140,016 3.71 -12.81 21.80 140,176 4.59 -13.3 21.37 154.59 51.17 88.87
b20 9,716 4.94 4.32 3.33 10,268 9.61 11.68 3.31 10,835 15.13 17.44 3.66 10,981 16.61 16.25 3.47 11,116 18.0 18.81 7.0 18.0 54.23 63.32
b22 15,058 4.93 7.88 6.23 16,015 10.13 13.29 7.13 16,613 13.92 18.21 7.98 16,941 15.96 20.17 10.6 16,963 16.14 21.72 10.72 16.14 54.44 66.61
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Fig. 19. Distribution of layout cost for all 18 different structures we explored on various benchmarks. Top: without any optimization; bottom: with
buffer insertion applied (only outside of the structures). Note that the same benchmarks are applied for the top and bottom plots; benchmark labels
are accordingly placed between those plots. Also note the different scales for each plot. Each boxplot represents ten runs.
TABLE 12
Isomorphic instances, security level, layout cost (in %) with respect to
2D baseline, and SAT attacks (t-o is 100 hours).
Benchmark Structures Security Level
∗ Overheads SAT Attack [29]
Bottom Top k Area Power Delay Runtime
b14 16 14 30 -40.32 30.66 37.17 t-o
b15 1 27 19 46 -40.21 27.69 38.32 t-o
b17 1 84 80 164 -37.92 46.56 45.73 t-o
b18 200 145 345 -29.39 22.16 51.09 t-o
b19 200 200 400 -25.48 8.46 62.44 t-o
b20 38 32 70 -38.32 42.46 47.86 t-o
b22 58 50 108 -34.47 45.52 46.92 t-o
∗The level is defined as the sum of the least occuring structures in the bottom
and top tier; see also our security-aware partitioning technique in Sec. 7.3.
ports, customized cells for obfuscation of vertical intercon-
nects using Mg/MgO vias, and a security-driven synthesis
strategy. The latter allows us to apply k-security (a formally
secure scheme concerning Trojan insertion) for the first time
on large-scale designs and also to protect sensitive design
structures of choice readily.
We conduct comprehensive experiments on DRC-clean
layouts, using commonly considered benchmarks as well
as large-scale, “real-life” designs. Strengthened by extensive
security analysis, we argue that leveraging 3D integration
is highly promising for hardware security. Finally, we also
put forward a practical threat model which accounts for the
business practices of present-day design houses.
For future work, we plan to explore how 3D integration
can also provide resilience against physical attacks such as
invasive probing or exploitation of side-channel leakage.
Fig. 20. 2D layout (left), bottom/top tier of the F2F 3D IC (right), both for
benchmark b18. Yellow dots (very right) illustrate the F2F vias.
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S.I STUDY ON DIFFERENT TECHNOLOGY NODES
Using the ITC-99 benchmarks, here we gauge the capabil-
ities for heterogeneous 3D SM, assuming a trusted 180nm
foundry and an untrusted 45nm foundry. More specifically,
we leverage the OSU libraries [1]. Their libraries hold the
same number, type, and strengths of cells; this guarantees a
fair comparison since CAD tools cannot leverage different
versions of cells. Synopsys DC was used for synthesis and
place and route was performed using Cadence Innovus 17.1;
see also Sec. 6.1 for details on the F2F 3D setup.
PPA results for an aggressive timing closure of the 2D
baseline setup are given in Table S1. For the heterogeneous
F2F 3D setup, we observe performance degradations as we
lift more and more gates to the trusted low-end tier (Fig. S1).
Also, note from Table S1 that area (and power) cost is ≈12X
(and 9X) when contrasting 180nm to 45nm. To maintain a
balanced utilization for both tiers, these findings imply that
one should not lift more than ≈8% of the gates to the low-
end tier. While such small-scale lifting provides a reasonable
performance gain, especially from the perspective of com-
missioning only the 180nm foundry, it may not be enough
to cover all the sensitive design parts.
These findings are in general agreement with those pro-
vided in Sec. 4.1.
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Fig. S1. Performance degradation when lifting gates in 3D from the
45nm tier to the 180nm tier. Dotted lines indicate the critical-path delays
for the 180nm 2D baseline setup. See also Table S1 and its footnote.
TABLE S1
Timing-aggressive 2D baselines, based on the OSU libraries [1]. All
layouts are DRC clean. Area is in µm2, power in mW , and delay in ns.
Benchmark 45nm 180nm
Instances Area Power Delay Instances Area Power Delay
b17 1 14,850 32,770.28 8.85 2.29 14,711 417,416 71.54 3.59
b20 6,959 15,549.31 8.12 2.87 7,521 216,168 97.94 3.6
b21 7,327 16,096.05 8.79 2.88 7,060 203,216 85.66 3.89
The 45nm node is four generations away from 180nm, and delays improve by
≈30% per generation [2]; surprisingly, delay degradations for OSU 180nm are
considerably off from this expectation. We believe that this is due to the
academic nature of the library.
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